“The armed forces of Germany must be prepared, even before the conclusion of the war with England, to defeat Soviet Russia in one rapid campaign (’Operation Barbarossa’).” Adolf Hilter, Directive No. 21.

On 22 June 1941 the Axis forces surged across the Polish border to begin the largest land battle in the history of warfare. Only six months later, as a brutally cold winter set in, Germany’s exhausted offensive froze to a halt in the suburbs of Moscow. Hitler’s panzers would never advance farther in the remaining three and a half years until his death. For decades after Germany’s unconditional surrender, the verdict of history has been not only that the Wehrmacht failed to defeat the Red Army and win the Second World War, but that they could not. The conventional wisdom is that German command grossly miscalculated the scope of the operation, thus embarking on a mission impossible to achieve and one leading directly to total defeat and dismemberment of Germany by the allied powers.

However evidence to the contrary may be hidden under the Allied victory in the west and the Red Army’s crushing victory in the east. The fact is that the German army stood on the threshold of an enormous victory in the Fall of 1941, and it could be argued that Hitler’s decision to send the panzers from Army Group Center away from Moscow robbed the Wehrmacht of victory over the Soviets.

Three Army Groups launched the attack again the Soviet Union on June 22nd, engaging roughly 2.6 million German soldiers accompanied by over 100,000 Romanian and Hungarian soldiers. Army Group North, commanded by von Leeb, totalled 20 divisions. Army Group Centre, commanded by von Bock, totalled 51 divisions and included the Guderian’s highly capable 2nd Panzer Group. Army Group South, commanded by von Rundstedt, totalled 40 German divisions, 14 Romanian divisions and the Hungarian Carpathian Army Corps.

The surprise and speed of the German invasion rendered Soviet defensive plans useless. The Soviet forces directly facing the German assault were equal in number at roughly 2.6 million soldiers; however they lacked competent officers, radios and other essential communication equipment. In the opening stages of the attack, from Red Army commanders (if issued) were often out of date by the time they were received.

In contrast to the poor state of preparedness of the Red Army defenders, the German Army of 1941 was well equipped and fueled by the confidence that comes from repeated low-cost victories. Their a doctrine of mobility and annihilation overwhelmed and shattered the Red Army defenses. By day 17 of the invasion, Army Group Center alone captured over 300,000 soldiers and 2,500 tanks. By December 1941 more than 2.4 million Soviet troops would be taken prisoner.

On the verge of collapse, with Moscow destined to fall, the Red Army was saved by Hitler’s decisions to split his Panzer offensive southeast and north, delaying the eastward drive aimed at Moscow. By the time the eastward offensive resumed; mud, poor logistics and a lack of preparation for a harsh and early winter, had frozen the German panzers in the suburbs of Moscow. In early December the Soviets were now more prepared than the Germans: well supplied and equipped for the winter, they defended Moscow ferociously and drove the Germans into the frozen wastelands where they would spend the winter exposed to the elements and Soviet counter attacks while being plagued by food and material shortages.

The war on the Eastern Front lasted for another bloody 4 years. The death toll would be staggering: Red Army military deaths estimated as high as 15 million, Soviet civilian deaths as high as 20 million, German military deaths estimated to be over 3 million from either combat or Soviet captivity.

Sources: Wikipedia | HistoryLearningSite

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